Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1964

Elizabeth B. Archer v. Utah State Land Board et al :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Pratt Kesler; Ronald N. Boyce; Hugh C. Garner; Attorney for Defendants and Respondents;
Mark K. Boyle; Attorney for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Archer v. Utah State Land Board, No. 9990 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4392

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

I~

rfHE SUPREME COURT
OF THEC

,

STATE OF UTAH. 1964
M

)

F.LI/.ABETH B. ARCHER,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 9990.

tJT,\H ST.\ TE LAND BOARD,
et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATE LAND BOARD
:\ppeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson

A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
HUGH C. GARNER
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents

:\ L-\RK K. BOYLE
345 South State St.
~.dt Lake City, l'"tah

Attorney for Appellant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

n

'·-~-"

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

S'f'ATE7\lE!':'f OF THE KI:\fJ) OF CASE ·····················-----------

1

DISPOSITION I~ LOWER COURT -·········-----------------------------RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -···········---------------------.--------------STA'fEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------------------

1
2
2

.\RGUMENT:
POINT I. THESTATELANDBOARDHASNOMANDATORY DUTY TO LEASE STATE
LANDS FOR OIL AND GAS PURPOSES
MERELY BECAUSE A POTENTIAL
LESSEE FILES AN APPLICATION TO
LEASE. ---------------------------------------------------------------- 4
POINT II. APPELLANT'S PETITION DOES NOT
STATE A CLAIM ENTITLING HER TO
RELIEF SINCE:
(A) THE COMPLAINT'S ALLEGATIONS
ARE INCONSISTENT WITH EACH
OTHER.
(B) THE LANDS COVERED BY THE
APPLICATION HAVE BEEN COM1\tliTTED TO UTILIZATION AND
ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR LEASING.
(C) THE REMEDY SOUGHT IS NOT
APPLICABLE. ------------------------------------------ 10
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT
JURISDICTION IN THE INSTANT CASE
TO THE EXTENT THAT THE APPELLANT SOUGHT RELIEF BY MANDAMUS BECAUSE:
( 1) THE APPELLANT'S PLEADINGS
ARE NOT IN THE NATURE OF
MANDAMUS.
(2) MANDAMUS WILL NOT LIE TO
COMPEL A DISCRETIONARY ACT. 14
POINT IV. THE APPELLANT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT DEPRIVED THE COURT OF
JUDISDICTION ON THE GROUNDS OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND FOR THE
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 65-1-9,
U .C.A. 1953. -------------------------------------------------------- 21
CONCLUSION _____ .. __ .___ .___________ .---------------------------------------.--------- _____ 24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS- Continued
Page

AUTHORITIES CITED
55 C.J.S., Mandamus, Sec. 259 -------------------------------------------------------- 14
73 C.J.S., Public Lands, Sec. 259 ---------------------------------------------------- 9
CASES CITED
Civic Fed. of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 22 U. 6,
61 p. 222 ( 1900) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
Cope v. Toronto, 8 U.2d 255, 332 P.2d 977 ------------------------------------ 16
DeCorso v. Thomas, 89 U. 160, 59 P.2d 951 ---------------------------------- 21
Deseret Savings Bank v. Francis, 62 U. 85, 217 P. 114 ( 1923) ______ 5
Haley v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ------------------------ 8, 12
Hamblin v. State Board of Land Comm., 55 U. 402,
187 P. 178 ( 1919) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 5, 18
Jordan v. Ickes, 143 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ---------------------------- 20
Klaiber v. Frank, 13 N.J. Super 388, 80 A.2d 470, 472 ( 1951) ____ 5
Miles v. Wells, 22 U. 55, 61 P. 534 ( 1900) ---------------------- 9, 11, 16, 18
McGarry v. Udall, "216 F.Supp. 314 (D.C. Cir. 1962) -------------------- 9
McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 U.2d 238,381 P.2d 726
( 1963) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6, 9, 20
Phillips Petroleum v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (lOth Cir. 1954) ------ 13
Safarik v. Udall, 304 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ---------------------------- 9
Smith v. Curtis, 223 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civil App. 1949) ---------------- 5
Smyth v. Butters, 38 U. 151, 112 P. 809 ( 1910) ---------------------------- 16
State ex rei. Bishop v. Morehause, 38 U. 234, 112 P. 169 ( 1910) ---- 16
State ex rei. Public Service Comm. v. Southern Pac. Co., 95 U. 84,
79 P.2d 25 ( 1938) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
State v. Walker, 292 P.2d 329 (New Mex. 1956) --------·------------------- 16
Thor-Westcliffe v. Udall, 314 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ------------ 9
U.S. ex rei. Roughton v. Ickes, 101 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1938) ---- 19
Whitmore v. Candland, 47 U. 77, 151 P. 528 ( 1915) ____ 9, 16, 19,20
\Vilkinson v. State, 42 U. 483, 134 P. 626 -------------------------·····---------- 21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABI .. E OF CONTENTS- Continued
Page

STATUTES CITED
~t·w

Mexico Statutes Annotated 1953, 7-9-2 ................................ 16

United Statt's Code Annotated, Sees. 181, 221, 226 ........................

8

United States Constitution, Article I, Sec. 10 ·······--------------------------- 13
Fourteenth Amendment -------------------- 13
Compiled Laws of Utah 1917, Sec. 5588 ------------------------------------------

5

Laws of Utah 1959, Ch. 131, Sec. 1, Ch. 132, Sec. 1 ------------------------

7

l' tah Code Annotated 1953: 40-1- ------------------------------------------------ 16
40-6-3 ------------------------------------------······ 12
40-6-6 ·----------------------------------------------- 12
65-1-9 -----------------------------····-·· 21, 22, 23
65-1-14 ········------------------------ 6, 7' 11' 20
65-1-18 ·········--·······-··················· 6, 7' 11
65-1-45 ----···················-----··········-- 13, 14
65-1-63 ···············-··-····················-····-- 11
65-1-88 ·····-·················- 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 7 ·····-----------------------·············· 14
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 15 .......................................... 23
65B (b) ( 2) ----------··········--------········ 22
65B (b) ( 3) .................................... 14
TEXTS CITED

~lyers, Laws of Pooling and Unitization~ Sec. 1301 ........................ 13
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2803 ..................

5

Sec. 5201 ------------------

6

Sec. 5202 --·--------------·

7

Sec. 7214 ..................

5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I~ rri-IE SUPREME COURT
()~.,THE

s--rATE OF UTAH
ELIZ.\BE~rH B.

ARCHER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-

\"S. ---

Case No. 9990.

UT.\H s·rATE LAND BOARD,
et al.,

f)t'/cndants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATE LAND BOARD
ST.\ TE~IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

The appellant brought the instant action against therespondents and others to have the court order the issue of a
valid oil and gas lease from the State Land Board to the
appellant.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant filed a complaint on May 6, 1963, against
the respondents and others. The respondents filed motions
to diqniss the complaint. Briefs were filed by the parties
and on July 16, 1963, the appellant's original complaint was
dismissed. On August 5, 1963, the appellant filed a motion
for leave to file an amended complaint, which motion was
granted by a judge other than the one who dismissed the
complaint. On August 5, 1963, the appellant filed an
amended complaint. Thereafter, the respondent filed a
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motion to dismiss the action. On August 19, 1963, the motion to dismiss was granted and a judgment dismissing the
complaint entered. On August 23, 1963, the appellant filed
a motion to amend the judgment. On September 5, 1963,
the court entered its final amended judgment dismissing
the appellant's amended complaint. The appellant has
appealed from the dismissal of his amended complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondents submit the trial court's decision dismissing the appellant's amended complaint should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent, State Land Board and its members and
Director, adopts the statement of facts as stated in the
appellant's brief except supplements them as follows:
The appellant's original complaint (R. 1--4) filed on
May 6, 1963, was dismissed upon motion of the respondents
State Land Board and Gulf Oil Corporation, Southern Natural Gas Company, Sinclair Oil and Gas Company, J. M.
Ruby, Glenna Ruby, Glen M. Ruby and Helen Ruby (R.
112) . The order entered by the court was final, and did not
grant the appellant leave to amend her complaint (R. 112).
Some eighteen days later on August 5, 1963, the appellant
applied to another judge and received an order allowing
her to file an amended complaint, which was filed the same
day (R. 113, 114, 115). In the interim, between the dismissal of the appellant's original complaint and the order
granting the appellant leave to file her amended complaint,
the appellant did nothing to protest the action of the State
Land Board which is the subject of the amended complaint.
No allegation of any action by the appellant during this
interval is set out in the appellant's complaint.
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~rhe

appcllant,s amended complaint is styled as a complaint and docs not ask the trial court in any fashion to issue
a \vrit of mandamus against any of the private respondents
on the Land Board ( R. 115-123). The complaint merely
asks that the interests of the individual defendants in the
land described as Section 16, Township 26 South, Range 20
East, SIJM, Grand County, Utah, be adjudged null and
\'Oid, and that the State Land Board be ordered to issue a
valid oil and gas lease to the appellant pursuant to her application (R. 120).
The complaint of the appellant is somewhat inconsistent
in its allegations. First, it alleges in the first cause of action
that the State Land Board issued an asphalt oil and gas
lease on the lands sought for lease by the appellant, and contends that the lease expired in 195 7. However, in the second
cause of action, the appellant contends the same lease has
been assigned and expired in 1961. Further, in the appellant ,s third cause of action she alleges that certain oil companies, including the respondent companies, claim an interest in the original lease, ML 1856, by virtue of certain
assignments and partial assignments. Finally, in the appellant's fourth cause of action, it is alleged that the lands
sought by the appellant's application have been committed
to the Long Canyon Unit (oil and gas utilized area) and
that the remainder of defendants as well as the respondents
claim an interest in the lands by virtue of their commitment
to the unit ( R. 115-121 ) . Therefore, the appellant ackno,vledges outstanding interests in the lands which she
sought to lease by her application. 1
The appellant alleges that although there were the
claims of the individual respondents to the lands she sought
The spe~ific interests recognized by the Land Board are set out in the
bnef of the pnvate respondents in support of the motion to dismiss ( R. 64-68) .
1

•
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to lease, that on March 2, 1962, she filed her amended
application to lease the lands, and the Land Board rejected
her application and that in June, 1962, the Board committed the lands encompassed by her application to unitization (R. 120).
Based on the facts set out herein and those noted in the
appellant's brief not inconsistent therewith, the trial court
dismissed the appellant's amended complaint because ( 1)
it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,
and ( 2) that the court was without jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE STATE LAND BOARD HAS NO MANDATORY DUTY
TO LEASE STATE LANDS FOR OIL AND GAS PURPOSES
MERELY BECAUSE A POTENTIAL LESSEE FILES AN APPLICATION TO LEASE.

The appellant contends that the trial court had a mandatory duty to issue a lease to her when she filed her application to lease state lands. She contends that 65-1-88, U.C.A.
1953, made such action a mandatory obligation upon the
Land Board. 65-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"Except as otherwise provided by section 65-1--45, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended by this act, oil and gas leases in units
not exceeding 640 acres or one section, whichever is larger, shall
be issued to the applicant first applying for the lease who is qualified to hold a lease under this act. * * *"

The basis for the appellant's contention is that the statute
uses the word "shall" thus evidencing an intent on the part
of the Legislature to make it mandatory for the Board to
issue such a lease. This places too much stress on the word
"shall." First, it should be noted that the statute does not
say anything as to the lessee except that he will be qualified,
but if the statute is to be read as mandatory when the ap-
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plicant is qualified, the Land Board would be compelled to
issue lfases even if the land were otherwise under a lease,
or being used for some other state purpose, such as a National (;uard firing range, or grazing or reclamation purposrs. Obviously, the Legislature could not have intended
so much from the use of the word "shall." It is agreed that
often the word "shall" is used in the mandatory sense,
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2803;
/Jcserrt Savings Bank v. Francis, 62 Utah 85, 217 Pac. 114
( 1923) ; however, such is not always the case. Thus, Sutherland, supra, notes that there may be exceptions based on
legislative policy and cites Chapter 72 of the same treatise
for that position. Chapter 72, Section 7214 of Sutherland,
supra, states:
HOf great public importance are laws providing for the conservation of natural resources and thus they are given a liberal construction. Statutes of this sort are fish and game laws, and legislation regulating the waste of mineral resources. In the regulation of mining and oil drilling it has become common for the
statutes to vest broad regulatory powers in administrative agencies. These statutes must be given an extended interpretation if
their objectives are to be accomplished."

In Klaiber v. Frank, 13 N.J. Super 388,80 A.2d 470,4 72
( 1951 ) , the New Jersey court noted :
"* * * True it is that the statute says that the person in question
'sh.all not be subject to service of personal process,' the word 'shall'
betng normally mandatory. However, depending upon the context, 'shall' may be construed in a permissive sense, if the character
of the legislation so indicates. * * *"

See also Smith v. Curtis, 223 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civil App.
1949).
In Hamblin v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 55
l~tah 402, 187 Pac. 178 ( 1919), this court ruled that the
term "must"' as used in Compiled Laws 1917, Sec. 5588,
relating to the preference rights of applications to purchase
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state lands was not mandatory in that a certificate of sale
need not be issued within ninety days after application,
and that the State Land Board still maintained discretion
whether to sell.
This court has recognized that 65-1-88, U.C.A. 1953,
does not purport to divest the Land Board of discretion. In
McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 U.2d 238, 381 P.2d 726
( 1963 ) , this court, on certiorari, reviewed a denial of the
petitioner's oil and gas application to lease state lands. This
court stated :
"We find Rule 6 is not inconsistent \vith Section 65-1-88, U.C.A.
1953. The Land Board has full power and authority to prescribe
necessary and proper rules and regulations to accomplish its purposes and objectives as set out by statute. In administering the
Act, the Board exercises such a discretionary, rather than a ministerial function. The provisions of the Act clearly indicate that the
Legislature had in mind the distinction between a positive mandate to the Board and a permissive right to take certain actions in
its discretion.***"

Further, it should be noted that 65-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, does
not stand alone in stating the powers of the Land Board to
dispose of state lands. Other statutes within Chapter 65
speak in permissive terms, and it is generally recognized
that statutes dealing with the same subject should be construed harmoniously and are in pari materia. Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Sec. 5201 ; State ex rel.
Public Service Commission v. Southern Pac. Co., 95 Utah
84, 79 P.2d 25 ( 1938). In this regard, it should be noted
that 65-1-14, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"The state land board shall have the direction, management and
control of all lands heretofore or hereafter granted to this state by
the United States government, or others, and of lands lying below
the water's edge of any lake or stream to the bed of which the
state is entitled, for any and all purposes whatsoever, except lands
used or set apart for public purposes or occupied by public buildings, and may sell or lease the same for the best interests of the
state in accordance with law; * * * ."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
In addition, 65-1-18, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
.. ·rhe state land board

may issue leases for exploring, developing
and producing oil and gas, or for prospecting .and m~ning purposes,
upon any portions of the unsold lands or mineral Interests of the
state. * * * .,

Both 65-1-14 and 65-1-18, U.C.A. 1953, were re-enacted
in 1959,La\vsofUtah 1959,Ch.131,Sec.1,Ch.132,Sec.1.
65-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, was enacted the same year. Chapter
132, Sec. 4. Certainly, the Legislature could not have intended to allow 65-1-88 to make leasing mandatory and at
the same time leave 65-1-14 and 18 in their permissive
form. Statutes enacted during the same legislative term are
to be construed harmoniously and to effect the intent of the
Legislature. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed.,
Sec. 5202, comments:
"***However, application of the rule that statutes ~n pari materia
should be construed together is most justified in the case of statutes
relating to the same subject matter that were passed at the same
session of the legislature, especially if they were passed or approved
or take effect on the same day, and in the case where the later of
two or more statutes relating to the same subject matter refers to
the earlier. * * *"

Therefore, the provisions of 65-1-88, U.C.A. 1953,
should not be construed as making it mandatory for the
Land Board to issue an oil and gas lease to a qualified applicant. The Land Board must have discretion based upon the
needs of the state. It is admitted that where the Land
Board has t\\·o applicants at the same time for the same land
it cannot arbitrarily discriminate against one and in favor
of another, but the Land Board may refuse to lease if the
best interests of the state require, or if the applicant's offer
is only for the purpose of clouding titles or other reasons
contrary to good land management.
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In Haley v. Seaton) 281 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1960), the
Federal Court adopted a similar construction under the
Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C.A., Sees. 181,221,226. The
court noted :
"* * * The applications to lease were in form, and, we think, in
legal effect, mere offers to lease. Assuming that Haley was 'the
person first making application,' he acquired a preference right
as against third persons, but in our opinion he acquired no vested
rights as against the United States. This conclusion is supported,
we think, by the decisions in analogous cases under the Homestead
and Preemption Laws."

The Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C.A., Sees. 181, 221,
226, is similar to the Utah act in that it speaks first of the
permissive right of the Secretary of Interior to dispose of the
public domain, and thereafter, the word "shall" is used
with reference to leases. Still the federal courts have ruled
that the issuance of an oil and gas lease is a matter within
the discretion of the Secretary of Interior. Thus, in Haley
v. Seaton) supra, the court stated:
"The court, in United States ex rei. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S.
414, 418, 419, 51 S.Ct. 502, 504, 75 L.Ed. 1148, held that the provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act plainly indicated 'that Congress held in mind the distinction between a positive mandate to
the Secretary and permission to take certain action in his discretion. Also, the difference between applicants for mere privileges
and those persons who, because of expenditures, or otherwise, deserved special consideration' and' "that under that Act, [1920] the
granting of a prospecting permit for oil and gas is discretionary
with the Secretary of the Interior and any application may be
gran ted or denied, * * *." '
Prior to the amendment of§ 17 by the Act of August 8, 19:46, this
court had held that the Secretary of the Interior had discretionary
power to accept or reject an application for a noncompetitive oil
and gas lease under § 17.
This court, in United States ex rei. Jordan v. Ickes, 79 App.D.C.
114, 143 F.2d 152, certiorari denied 320 U.S. 801, 64 S.Ct. 432,
88 L.Ed. 484; 323 U.S. 759, 65 S.Ct. 98, 89 L.Ed. 608, held that
it was not the intent of Congress by the amendatory Act of August
21, 1935, to deprive the Secretary of the Interior of such discre-
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tion accorded hin1 under the original Act, except as to a very
lituitcd group of applications filed 90 days prior to the effective
d;ttc· of the amendrnent.
\Ve are of the opinion that the 1946 amendment in nowise limited
"urh power in the Secretary of the Interior and continued his
discretionary power either to grant or reject applications for
lc·ast·s. * * *.,

Numerous other federal courts have similarly ruled in addition to those cited in Haley. Safarik v. Udall, 304 F.2d 944
(D.C. Cir. 1962); Thor-Westcliffe v. Udall, 314 F.2d 257
(D.C. Cir. 1963); McGarry v. Udall, 216 F.Supp. 314
(D.C. Cir. 1962).
Further, the federal cases are in line with the generally
recognized rule that there is no compulsion upon the sovereign to lease its lands to private owners. 73 C.J.S., Public
Lands, Sec. 259; Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55, 61 Pac. 534
( 1900); Whitmore v. Candland, 47 Utah 77, 151 Pac. 528
( 1915) ~McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 U.2d 238, 381
P.2d 726 ( 1963). Certainly, 65-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, was
not intended to place a mandatory duty on the state to lease
lands for oil and gas; rather, the statute must be construed
as discretionary in the first instance, giving the Land Board
power to withhold lands from leasing, but if the Land Board
has two applicants for the same lands at the same time and
has determined to lease, it may not arbitrarily discriminate
in favor of one applicant but "shall" issue a lease to the
first properly qualified applicant. Consequently, appellant
cannot say that 65-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, makes mandatory
the issuance of a lease to her.
The appellant's argument that the Rules and Regulations of the Land Board recognize that issuance of an oil
and gas lease is mandatory is erroneous. The Rules and
Regulations cited by the appellant were not in effect when
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the suit in this case was filed. Rule 2 (b) dated January 9,
1963, presently reads:
"The Land Board may grant a lease to a qualified applicant whose
application is first filed provided that the rental and royalty offered
is acceptable to the Board."

Rule 7 (d) is as set out in appellant's brief, p. 13, but has
been construed by the Land Board as only applying to
simultaneous filings if the Land Board first determines the
land should be leased. The Board has construed its own
rules as not compelling lands to be leased in the first instance. Consequently, there is no merit to the appellant's
position.
POINT II.
APPELLANT'S PETITION DOES NOT STATE A CLAIM ENTITLING HER TO RELIEF SINCE:
(A) THE COMPLAINT'S ALLEGATIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH EACH OTHER.
(B) THE LANDS COVERED BY THE APPLICATION
HAVE BEEN COMMITTED TO UTILIZATION AND
ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR LEASING.
(C) THE REMEDY SOUGHT IS NOT APPLICABLE.

(A) Appellant contends that the allegations set out in
her amended complaint would give her a cause of action.
The appellant contends that her complaint has set forth the
requisite items to allow the court to issue a lease. This overlooks two items. First, 65-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, is discretionary with the Land Board, except where it determines
to lease lands, it may not arbitrarily reject the application
of an otherwise qualified applicant. There is no allegation
that the Land Board has improperly preferred one applicant over another, and although appellant alleges the lands
are available for leasing, she also alleges that the Land Board
has committed the lands to unitization, and that other persons claim an interest in the lands by virtue of a state min-
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t'ral lease, M. L. 1856. ,.fhese inconsistent allegations, plus
thf uncontradicted facts set out in the brief of the private
respondents on the first motion to dismiss ( R. 64-67), demonstrate that what the appellant in fact did was attempt to
pirate leases presently existing on the lands by "top-filing"
applications with the Land Board. Since 65-1-88, U.C.A.
1953, when read with 65-1-14 and 18, U.C.A. 1953, gives
the Board some discretion to recognize applications to lease
or reject them, the Land Board was under no duty to bow
to the top-filed application and allow a cloud on the lessee's
title. The allegations in appellant's amended complaint are
inconsistent with a good faith application to lease open
lands. Consequently, it affords him no claim for relief.
:\Iiles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55, 61 Pac. 534 ( 1900).
(B) The appellant's complaint recites in its fourth cause
of action that subsequent to the time the appellant made
application to lease the lands in question, but prior to the
time any lease had been issued, the State Land Board committed the lands to an oil and gas unit, to-wit, the Long
Canyon Unit Area in Grand County (R. 120). The appellant makes a general allegation to the effect that since the
commitment of the lands to the unit was without the consent of the appellant that the commitment was void. It is
submitted that the appellant's contention is erroneous, and
that since the lands have now been committed to an oil and
gas unit, they are not available for leasing, and the court
correctly dismissed the appellant's complaint. 65-1-63,
U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"The state land board is authorized to join on behalf of the state of
Utah _in co-operative or ~nit plans <?f development or operation on
[of] otl and gas pools With the Untted States government and its
less.ees or pe~ittees and others in such form as may be acceptable
to It, to modify or amend the same from time to time as in its
judgment it may deem advisable, to consent to and approve the
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designated participating area and any extension or contraction
thereof and to do all acts and things which it considers necessary
or advisable to make operative such unit plan or plans; * * *."

When the State Land Board acts as the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 40-6-3, U.C.A. 1953, it has the
power to establish drilling units and authorized pooling
under certain circumstances. 40-6-6 U.C.A. 1953. There
is no question, therefore, that the Land Board had the
power to commit the lands in Section 16, which were the
subject of the appellant's application, to unitization. The
only question is whether there was any vested right in the
appellant at the time she submitted her application to the
lands leased to her. As noted above, the law in Utah is to
the effect that the Land Board is vested with discretion as
to whether or not to lease or otherwise dispose of state lands,
and an applicant to lease state lands has no vested interest
in the lands merely by filing an application.
In Haley v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1960), the
Federal Circuit Court had a contention before it that where
the oil and gas applicant had filed an application to lease
the land, that the Secretary of Interior could not thereafter
withdraw the lands for other purposes. In rejecting the contention, the court stated:
"* * * Haley was 'the person first making application,' he acquired
a preference right as against third persons, but in our opinion he
acquired no vested rights as against the United States.* * *"

The situation in the Haley case is applicable to the instant fact situation, since the appellant received no vested
right at the time of making an application and, she could
in no way complain because the Land Board determined
to thereafter commit the lands to unitization. She is, consequently, without remedy and cannot now contend the
Land Board \\ras without power to unitize, and that she
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should be issued the lease. The unit is a contract between
persons and the vested contractual rights of the unit parties
may not be interfered with by the plaintiff without violating
constitutional provisions against the interference with the
right of contract. U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 10; Amendment XI\'; Myers Law of Pooling and Unitization, Sec.
1301; Phillips Petroleum v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (lOth
Cir. 1954}. As a consequence, the appellant has no basis to
claim relief since the lands have been unitized and she may
not now demand the issuance of a lease to state lands.
(C) It is submitted that the trial court again correctly
dismissed the action on the grounds that the relief sought
by the appellant could not be granted by the court, and
,,·ould be contrary to the provisions of 65-1-45, U.C.A.
t953. This section provides:
"In all cases where lands become available for leasing by the state
because they are newly acquired or because a previous mineral
lease is canceled or otherwise terminated by the board, such lands
shall be offered for mineral lease by the following procedure only:
(a) Within sixty days after such acquisition or termination, a
notice of the lands having so become available for leasing shall be
posted in the state land office. The notice shall describe the land,
indicate what mineral interest in each tract is available for leasing
and state the last date, which shall be fifteen days after the notice
is posted, on which bids will be received."

This provision encompasses what is commonly known as
simultaneous filing, and requires that when other leasehold
interests are canceled that the lands be leased only on the
basis of simultaneous filing if the Land Board determines
to lease the lands. Opinion of the Attorney General, 61073, October 27, 1961, Biennial Report 1962, p. 185.
Since there are outstanding interests under state lease
presently against the lands, the court would have to order
the Land Board to cancel those leases which would require
simultaneous filing. It could not order the Land Board to
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cancel the present leases and issue a lease to the appellant
without violating the provisions of 65-1-45, U.C.A. 1953.
Consequently, the trial court correctly dismissed the case,
finding that the relief sought was outside its power.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
THE INSTANT CASE TO THE EXTENT THAT THE APPELLANT SOUGHT RELIEF BY MANDAMUS BECAUSE:
( 1) THE APPELLANT'S PLEADINGS ARE NOT IN THE
NATURE OF MANDAMUS,
(2) MANDAMUS WILL NOT LIE TO COMPEL A DISCRETIONARY ACT.

( 1 ) The appellant contends that the trial court had
jurisdiction in the instant case to issue a writ of mandamus
to compel the State Land Board to issue a lease to her covering the lands in her application. It should be noted at the
outset that the appellant's complaint is in no way styled a
petition for a writ of mandamus, nor is there any prayer
anywhere in the appellant's complaint asking that the court
issue a writ of mandamus. It is recognized that 65B(b) (3)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, and Rule 65B, in general, purports to abolish extraordinary writs. However, to the extent that Rule 65B purports to abolish extraordinary writs
in substance, it would be contrary to the State Constitution,
Art. VIII, Sec. 7, which expressly recognizes the power in
the courts to issue the various common law writs. Consequently, the substantive nature of the writ of mandamus
and the procedural form not abolished by Rule 65B are still
in effect.
It is a generally recognized rule that a writ of mandamus
should be titled to the court from which the writ of man-
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darnus is sought. Thus, 55 C.J.S., Mandamus, Sec. 259,
states:
.. ·rhe application for a writ of mandamus should be addressed to
the court before which it is laid.
In the absence of statutes modifying the common-law practice,
neither the application, nor the affidavit on which it is founded,
nor the answer to the application should be entitled as in an ordinary cause, since in contemplation of law no cause is pen?ing
until the writ issues, the proceeding being ex parte up to that time.
Under statutes modifying the common-law rules and embodying
the liberal rule of pleading, mere irregularities in the title in pleadings in mandamus are immaterial."

The ntles of pleading under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have not modified the common-law rule by in any
\vay abolishing the need to address the petition to the court.
In fact, nothing is said in the rule relating to the particular
forms of pleading as far as title, address and other matters
are concerned. Consequently, there was still the need to
address the petition to the court from which the order was
sought. It is submitted that in this instance the appellant's
cause of action is in fact an affirmative injunction, and
sounds in common-law equity rather than mandamus, and
that the appellant has for the first time on appeal styled her
cause of action as being in "the nature of mandamus."
It is submitted, therefore, that the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain the instant action in that the
pleadings were in fact not in the nature of mandamus and
,,·ere not sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction to issue
a ''Tit of mandamus.
(2) The respondent, State Land Board, agrees with the
position of the appellant that in a proper case a writ of
mandamus \vill issue to compel a ministerial act. However,
it is well settled that mandamus will not lie to compel the
performance of a discretionary act. Civic Federation of
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Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 6, 61 Pac. 222
( 1900) ; State ex rel. Bishop v. M orehause, 38 Utah 234,
112 Pac. 169 ( 1910); Smyth v. Butters, 38 Utah 151, 112
Pac. 809 ( 1910).
The writ of mandamus is not expanded by virtue of the
promulgation of Rule 65B. Cope v. Toronto, 8 U.2d 255,
332 P.2d 977. Consequently, before the appellant could
prevail under her contention that the court had jurisdiction
to issue a writ of mandamus, it must appear that the issuance of the writ was a ministerial act. The appellant primarily relies upon the case of State v. Walker, 292 P.2d 329
(New Mex. 1956) , which, she states, is in point with reference to this case. A reading of that decision clearly demonstrates that the case is in no way in point. There the
New Mexico Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus
against the New Mexico Commissioner of Public Land to
compel him to accept for filing certain lode mining location
notices. The court characterized the responsibility of the
Public Land Commissioner in this respect as being purely
ministerial. New Mexico recognizes the right to location
upon state lands. 7-9-2, New Mexico Statutes Annotated
1953. There is no comparable statute in Utah which allows
an individual to locate on public lands belonging to the
State of Utah. The provisions of Title 40, Chapter 1,
U.C.A. 1953, have no application to state lands since Title
65, Chapter 1 has vested the complete disposition of state
lands in the Land Board. Whitmore v. Candland, 47 Utah
77, 151 Pac. 528 ( 1915). Consequently, the New Mexico
case is in no way in point. It does not deal with the issuance
of a lease, it does not deal with the question of contractual
rights in state lands, and involved purely a ministerial task.
This court has previously recognized on several occasions
that a writ of mandamus will not lie to compel the State
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Land Board to dispose of state lands to any particular applicant. Thus, in Whitmore v. Candland, supra, the Supreme Court noted as to the powers of the State Land
Board:
"* * * The whole matter of making disposition of the state's land
was placed in the hands and under the control ?f
State Lan~
Board. No right of appeal to the courts, or of revieWing the boards
at'tions otherwise by the courts, except where lack or excess of
power is alleged, has been given. All the courts can do, therefore,
is to inquire into and detern1ine in a proper proceeding whether
the board has acted without or in excess of its powers or jurisdiction.***"

t?e

In Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55,61 Pac. 534 (1900), the
plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus against the defendants
who were the State Board of Land Commissioners, to receive the application of the petitioner for the selection of
certain lands to select the same and to sell the same to the
petitioner. The court ruled that mandamus was not a
proper remedy and that the State Land Board could not
be compelled to undertake the act sought to be forced by a
''Tit of mandate. It stated:
"The court has no jurisdiction to direct, by mandamus, how the
discretionary power, in the premises, vested in the board by the
statute, shall be exercised."

Further, the court in the same case commented:
"The ap~e~lant predicates his alleged rights in the premises upon
the prov1s1ons of Sec. 16 and claims by virtue of its provisions, that
when he made application for the selection of said lands and
tendered to the Board, as the first payment for the same, twentyfive cents per acre, he acquired the absolute right to have selected
and to purchase said lands at the price of $1.50 per acre, and to
pay the balance of the purchase money in ten equal yearly payments, and that it became and was the mandatory duty of the
Board to make a selection of said lands and enter into a contract
of sale to him of said lands, at the price and on the terms mentioned."
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The court, in holding it could not direct the Land Board to
act, commented:
"The minds of the parties have never met, either on the question
of price, or the time of the deferred payments. Under the statute
after an application for lands is made, until the selection is made
and the price to be paid, and the time in which the deferred payments shall be made are fixed by the board, and assented to by
the applicant, and a contract of sale containing the stipulation
agreed upon is executed, the applicant has no vested rights whatever.''

The standard oil and gas lease which the State of Utah
issues has many conditions apart from those imposed by
statute. Until there has been a reasonable meeting of the
minds or a determination of the State Land Board that it is
in the best interests of the state to lease for oil and gas or to
recognize a top-filed application, and until there has been a
determination of what clauses or provisions are in the best
interests of good land management, there has not been a
sufficient meeting of the minds as to say that there is a contract form which would compel the issuance of a lease.
Directly in point is the case of Hamblin v. State Board of
Land Commissioners, 55 Utah 402, 187 Pac. 178 ( 1919).
There the plaintiff sought to compel the court to issue a
peremptory writ of mandate to require the defendant Land
Board to issue to plaintiff a certificate of sale for certain
school land covered by its application. The statute in question used the word "must.', This court, however, determined that the word "must" was directory as used in the
statute, and that the Land Board still had discretion to
refuse the sale. The court cited several federal and state
decisions recognizing the general discretion to dispose of
the public domain. The court then stated, citing Miles v.
'Veils, supra, that the Land Board still maintained discretion to dispose of the public lands and that the writ of man-
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damus would not lie to compel its issuance. This case is
applicable here for, as noted in the arguments above, the
qufstion to lease or not to lease is one within the discretion
of the State Land Board, and mandamus will not lie.
An almost identical federal case is United States ex rel.
Roughton v. Ickes, 101 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1938). There
the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of Interior to issue an oil and gas lease to him. The
court rejected its power to issue mandamus and the right
of the petitioner to have the relief sought. In doing so, it
stated:
"Performance of an official act purely ministerial in its nature may
be commanded by mandamus. It is established that whenever the
conditions have been fulfilled whereby the relator in the mandanlus is entitled to call upon an officer to do an act beneficial to
the relator that act becomes a ministerial duty. [Citations omitted.]
But is it only when the duty of the officer to do the act is clear-cut,
well-defined, and positive that it is considered ministerial and
con1pellable by mandamus. If discretion exists, the duty is never
ministerial. * * * 'Where the right of the petitioner is not clear,
and the duty of the officer, performance of which is to be commanded, is not plainly defined and peremptory, mandamus is not
an appropriate remedy. [Cases.] The officer must be left free,
in the performance of official duty, to decide whether he will perform the act demanded or secure by appropriate procedure a
judicial determination of the extent of his duty. His decision "is
regarded as involving the character of judgment or discretion,"
the exercise of which will not be compelled by mandamus.' U.S.
ex rei. Girard Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 543, 57 S.Ct. 855,
857, 81 L.Ed. 1272. [Citations omitted.] Where there is discretion, 'even though its conclusion be disputable, it is impregnable
to mandamus.' Alaska Smokeless Coal Co. v. Lane, 250 U.S. 549,
555, 40 S.Ct. 33, 64 L.Ed. 1135. And where the matter 'is not
beyond peradventure clear, we have invariably refused the writ,
even though the question "·ere one of law as to the extent of the
sta~tory power of an administrative officer or body.' U.S. ex rei.
Chicago Greatwestem R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 294 U.S. 50, 63, 55 S.Ct. 326, 331, 79 L.Ed. 752.
The duties imposed by sec. 17, as amended, upon the Secretary of
the Interior in the administration of the land laws of the United
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States involve the exercise of judgment and discretion. Knight v.
U.S. Land Ass'n, supra. In such duties 'the courts will refuse to
substitute their judgment or discretion for that of the official entrusted by law with its execution. Interference in such a case would
be to interfere with the ordinary functions of government.' Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 633, 34 S.Ct. 938, 941, 58 L.Ed.
1506.
Indeed, the present case would offer a clear example of interference by courts if mandamus were ordered. As previously stated,
complete control and administration, under the statute, has been
vested in the Secretary of the Interior in all matters concerning
public lands of the United States.* * *"

See also jordan v. IckesJ 143 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
In Whitmore v. CandlandJ supra, this court also recognized that what is now Section 65-1-14, U.C.A. 1953, left
the question of the disposal of state lands completely to the
State Land Board. Infra p. 17. Thus, the court recognized
that the functions of the Land Board were not ministerial
and implicit in this recognition is the fact that mandamus
would not lie. If the Land Board has been arbitrary or
capricious in the exercise of its powers, the appropriate
means of review of such capriciousness is established by
Rule 65B (b) ( 2), which states:
"Where an inferior tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
functions has exceeded its jurisdictions or abused its discretion;
or***."

This is a re-statement of the common-law writ of certiorari
and is the standard means for review of decisions of the
State Land Board. McKnight v. State Land Board, supra.
Consequently, it is clear beyond cavil that the trial court
ruled correctly to the effect that it did not have jurisdiction
to entertain the appellant's amended complaint to the extent that it sought relief in the nature of mandamus.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
POINT IV.
THE APPELLANT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT DEPRIVED
THE COURT OF JURISDICTION ON THE GROUNDS OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND FOR THE FAILURE TO
C( l~IPLY WITH 65-1-9, U.C.A. 1953.

The appellant's amended complaint recites as a caption,
~'Elizabeth B. Archer v. Utah State Land Board." The
question presents itself as to whether or not the State Land
Board is subject to suit where the action is one against the
Board in its sovereign capacity. In DeCorso v. Thomas,
89 Utah 160, 50 P .2d 951, the court stated:
"Suffice it to observe that the defense that the state land board may
not be sued without its consent is for its benefit and protection,
and such defense is not available to defendant Mohlman."

In Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 Pac. 626, this
court ruled that the Land Board could not be sued for damages. All of these cases indicate that the defense of sovereign immunity is available to the State Land Board in a
normal action brought against it in the absence of some
action directed against the Land Board whereby the Legislature has provided specifically for suit. The Legislature
has provided under 65-1-9, U.C.A. 1953 for the means by
which contest for state lands may be adjudicated. This section reads:
.. ( 1) Where contests arise as to the preference rights of claimants
for lands under the control of the board, it shall have full power
to hold a hearing thereon and to direct the taking of evidence
~oncerning the questions involved, which hearing shall be reported
1n full. The board shall make findings of fact and conclusions of
law, enter its order with respect thereto, and notify the parties to
such hearing of its findings, conclusions and order.

(2). N~ ~laim~t for lands under control of the board can appeal
for judict~ re~~w of a decision of the board involving any sale,
lease, or dispoSition of state lands, or any action relating thereto
~less such claim~~ file.s a written protest with respect theret~
,.,,th the board Within ntnety days after the final decision of the
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board relating to such matter; or, with respect to decisions rendered prior to the effective date of this act, within ninety days after
such effective date. This provision shall not relate to disputes
between the board and any party as to the ownership or title to
any lands."

It is clear, therefore, that the Legislature has directed, first,
that the Land Board grant hearing on the matter if they
deem it advisable. If they do not, they may rule without
hearing, in which event an aggrieved party may only receive judicial review if it is otherwise available to him.
Since the issuance of a state lease is a rna tter of discretion
and one which may not be inquired into by mandamus, it
follows that an action against the State Land Board, as
such, is improper unless it is to challenge its actions, which
are in excess of its power. In that event, certiorari is the
proper remedy. McKnight v. State Land BoardJ 14 U.2d
238, 381 P.2d 726 ( 1963); Rule 65B(b) (2).
Since the appellant did not proceed by certiorari but by
a direct suit against the Land Board in an effort to have the
Land Board enjoined to perform the relief she seeks, the
defense of sovereign immunity is available and the court
correctly dismissed the case.
Additionally, it is submitted that the appellant has failed
to comply with the provisions of 65-1-9 (2), and that, as a
consequence, may not seek judicial review. 65-1-9 was
amended by the 1963 Legislature and provided that as to
any decision of the Land Board in a contest as to state lands
rendered prior to the effective date of the act, that in order
for the cause of action to be preserved, the protestant had
to file a written protest with the Land Board within 90 days
from the effective date of the act. The appellant's amended
complaint was filed on August 5, 1963. Prior to that time,
no protest was filed with the Land Board. It is submitted
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that in order for the appellant to have been allowed to file
hrr amended complaint after the passage of the amendment to 65-1-9, that she \vould have to have complied with
the protest requirements of that statute. It is, of course,
n-cognized that Rule 15 URCP provides that amended
pleadings \vill date back to the inception of the original
pleading, but the order of the court dismissing the appellant's original complaint did not provide for leave to amend,
and the appellant a,,·aited some 18 days before applying for
leave to amend her complaint, nor did the trial court find
that the dismissal of the first complaint was res judicata as
to the issues in the amended complaint. The issues in the
amended complaint are substantially broadened and different from those in the original petition, and since the original dismissal order did not perpetuate the action, it is submitted that compliance with the statute, 65-1-9, was necessary. To construe to the contrary would allow Rule 15 to
defeat the intention of the Legislature since a court could
grant the particular plaintiff the right to amend a dismissed
complaint at any subsequent time no matter how delayed,
and if the amendment were to date back to the time of
the original complaint and void the protest provisions of
65-1-9. The provision in the statute requiring protests
to be filed to perpetuate protests from decisions of the Land
Board prior to the effective date of the statute would thereby be nullified.
There is no good reason for the appellant not having
complied \vith the statute when her original complaint had
been dismissed without leave to amend subsequent to the
effective date of the statute. Since this provision is jurisdictional, the court correctly dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.
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CONCLUSION
An analysis of the contentions of the appellant indicate
that there was no error in the trial court's decision dismissing the amended complaint. At the time the complaint
was dismissed, the lands sought by the appellant's application to lease had been committed to unitization and, hence,
were not available for public leasing. Additionally, the
Land Board has discretion in the first instance whether or
not to lease state lands, and in doing so, may reasonably
determine to reject an application obviously filed for the
purposes of clouding title or pirating other leasehold interests. This is not a case of a good faith application or a
contest between two good faith applicants. The inconsistent
pleadings contained in the appellant's complaint make this
manifest.
Finally, the judicial remedy of mandamus is inapplicable, since the case does not involve performance of a ministerial act, and the appellant's failure to otherwise comply
with the provisions of law clearly demonstrates that the
trial court acted properly in dismissing the amended complaint.
This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted
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